The Security Gap in the Bangsamoro: Why Peace Needs Policing
4 SEP 2026
AEGIS | AHSAM Regional Analysts
Regional Security & Stability Desk
High ConfidenceAlthough the 2014 peace accord ended large-scale insurgency in the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) in the southern Philippines, local security almost certainly continues to be shaped by clan feuds (rido), political rivalry, and criminal rackets — collectively described as "horizontal violence." The chronic under-capacity of the regional police force means the military remains the de facto lead security actor.
Moderate ConfidenceViolence is likely to increase in the run-up to the September 2026 regional elections, driven by both the abundance of firearms and a leadership split within the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). Absent police reform, better military-police coordination, improved access to justice, and tighter firearms control, a recurring cycle of localized violence is likely to persist over the near-to-medium term.
- 01Chronic understaffing of the regional police force (roughly 7,000 personnel, with a typical station fielding barely twenty officers for municipalities of up to 25,000 people) continues to force Manila to rely on the military as the de facto security provider.
- 02Manila's March 2025 replacement of MILF chairman Murad Ebrahim with military-wing leader Abdulraof Macacua split the movement into rival factions, adding a new layer of complexity to local security dynamics.
- 03The rebel decommissioning process remains largely stalled: as of early 2026, roughly 14,000 former fighters and 2,450 weapons had yet to be formally decommissioned, sustaining the region's firearms surplus and the risk of violence.
Bottom Line Up Front
High ConfidenceThe 2014 peace accord and the 2019 establishment of BARMM formally ended decades of armed conflict between Manila and Moro Muslim separatist movements. Regional security nonetheless remains heavily dependent on the armed forces; the capacity and trust deficit affecting the police is likely to keep undermining the durability of local public order. Moderate ConfidenceThe September 2026 regional elections carry a real risk of converting existing political and armed tensions into open violence.
Key Judgments
| Confidence | Judgment |
|---|---|
| High | KJ-1. The 2014 peace agreement almost certainly ended large-scale insurgent violence, but clan feuds, politically driven clashes, and criminal rackets — "horizontal violence" — remain widespread across the region. |
| High | KJ-2. The numerical and logistical shortfalls of the regional police force (PRO-BARMM) mean that, particularly in the most conflict-affected parts of Central Mindanao, day-to-day security responsibility falls to military units by default. |
| Moderate | KJ-3. The MILF leadership change and the resulting factional split have likely weakened the movement's participation in the decommissioning process and carry the potential to complicate local violence dynamics further. |
| Moderate | KJ-4. The scale of the region's unregistered ("loose") firearms stock and the loose enforcement of existing gun laws are a key structural driver of the lethality and recurrence of clan clashes. |
| Moderate | KJ-5. The slowness, cost, and limited reach of the formal justice system — where filing a case can itself become the pretext for renewed score-settling — sustain reliance on traditional dispute-resolution mechanisms whose interaction with formal institutions remains uneven. |
| Low-Moderate | KJ-6. The September 2026 regional elections carry a real potential for rival political blocs to mobilize armed groups to intimidate voters or disrupt the polls. |
Tradecraft Note: Expressing Uncertainty
Probability language in this product is reported against the standardized scale below, alongside a separately reported confidence level. Confidence ratings (High / Moderate / Low) reflect the reliability of sourcing and the degree of corroboration available — not the likelihood that a given judgment is correct.
| Remote01–05% | Very Unlikely05–20% | Unlikely20–45% | Roughly Even Chance45–55% |
Likely55–80% | Very Likely80–95% | Almost Certain(ly)95–99% |
Key Assumptions, Sourcing, and Confidence Basis
- Source quality: this assessment is derived from a single open-source, field-research-based policy report examining police reform and the security transition in the Bangsamoro. The report states it draws on years of field work and more than eighty interviews conducted in the region. Reliance on a single open source supports Moderate-to-High confidence on descriptive judgments but caps forward-looking judgments at Moderate absent independent corroboration.
- Figures cited: police staffing levels (approximately 7,000), the unregistered-firearms estimate (over 27,000 as of late 2024), and the pending decommissioning figures (14,000 fighters, 2,450 weapons) are as reported by officials and observers cited in the source report; they have not been independently verified by this desk.
- Information gap: no independent forecast of when decommissioning will conclude, or of how the September 2026 elections will affect the security trajectory, was available at the time this product was prepared — a key driver of the Moderate-confidence ceiling on forward-looking judgments.
- Stated positions: the MILF's expectation that policing authority should eventually pass to the regional government, and Manila's preference for retaining centralized control, are treated here as reported positions from the source material, not as independently verified conclusions.
I. The Conflict Picture: From Insurgency to Horizontal Violence
While the 2014 peace accord and the 2019 creation of BARMM substantially halted the decades-long armed conflict between Manila and the MILF, a significant share of the region's youth report having experienced armed conflict near their homes since 2019. The security threat in the region is now driven less by jihadist remnants or communist-insurgency holdouts that stayed outside the peace process, and more by clan feuds (rido), political rivalry, and criminal networks — collectively termed "horizontal violence."
In Central Mindanao, particularly Cotabato City, Maguindanao del Sur, and parts of Lanao del Sur, the frequency of shooting incidents has reached a level one regional parliamentarian described as "pervasive lawlessness." The September 2026 regional elections are likely to raise the risk of rival political blocs mobilizing armed groups to influence the vote.
Division within the MILF compounds these tensions. Manila's March 2025 removal of movement leader Murad Ebrahim in favor of military-wing chief Abdulraof Macacua split the organization between commanders loyal to the Central Committee and those aligned with Macacua — an internal rift with the potential to intertwine with existing land and resource disputes and further fuel local violence.
II. Police Capacity: Structural Constraints
The 2014 peace agreement envisioned a civilian, effective, and accountable regional police force, but deliberately left the division of authority between Manila and the region ambiguous. The 2019 autonomy law rejected the idea of a separate Bangsamoro police force, keeping public order under national government responsibility; the regional police force (PRO-BARMM) was structured as part of the national police under Manila's control.
Although regional police staffing exceeds 7,000, a typical station fields barely twenty-odd officers for municipalities with populations of up to 25,000. This numerical shortfall means that in the most conflict-affected parts of Maguindanao, police often struggle even to conduct routine patrols, leaving public order effectively in military hands.
Integration of former MILF and MNLF fighters into the police has likewise been limited: 11,075 candidates sat a special qualifying exam in 2022, of whom 7,145 passed, yet ultimately only 396 former fighters actually joined the force. Manila's apparent reluctance to sustain dedicated quotas for ex-combatants suggests integration has lost momentum.
| Actor | Position / Role |
|---|---|
| National Police (PRO-BARMM) | Primary formal responsibility for public order and criminal investigation, but limited in numbers and logistics; structured under Manila's centralized control. |
| Armed Forces | The most operationally capable security actor in the region; continues counter-remnant operations while functioning as the de facto primary provider of local public order. |
| MILF | Formally renounced armed struggle but internally split; a faction of the movement continues to expect policing authority to eventually pass to the regional government. |
III. Firearms Proliferation and Access to Justice
The prevalence of firearms in the region directly fuels conflict and crime. As of late 2024, police estimated more than 27,000 unregistered firearms in circulation, against roughly 20,000 legally registered weapons. Highly permissive gun laws and the ease with which serial numbers can be removed to make weapons untraceable leave the pool of "loose" firearms largely beyond the state's ability to monitor.
The formal justice system compounds these dynamics: it is slow, costly, and difficult to access. Long distances, case backlogs, and high costs put the courts out of reach for many of the region's poorest residents. A pattern of score-settling between rival clans can turn even the filing of a court case after a killing into the pretext for a fresh round of retaliation. Community-based dispute-resolution traditions offer an alternative, but their interaction with formal institutions remains uneven, and disputes often resurface.
IV. Stalled Decommissioning
Although the 2014 agreement envisioned the gradual decommissioning of MILF forces, the movement suspended its participation in the process in early 2026, citing Manila's perceived failure to deliver promised socio-economic benefits. As of early 2026, roughly 14,000 fighters and 2,450 weapons had yet to be handed over. Talks in August 2026 formally lifted the suspension, but whether the decommissioning process has genuinely regained momentum remains unclear.
V. Outlook — Analysis of Alternatives
The four trajectories below are treated as competing hypotheses rather than a single default outcome.
Accelerated Police Reform
Rapid strengthening of the regional police force — adequate funding, staffing, and political will — allowing it to take on responsibilities currently held by the military. Resource constraints and institutional inertia make this unlikely in the near term.
Military-Led Status Quo Persists
The armed forces retain their dominant role without meaningful drawdown. Provides near-term stability but conflicts with the national military's broader pivot toward external defence and does nothing to build police capacity.
Gradual, Partial Progress
Limited police reforms, partial firearms-collection efforts, and renewed but uneven MILF engagement all advance in parallel post-election. Represents a continuation of the current fragile equilibrium without a clear inflection point.
Composite Trajectory — Phased Reform, Partial Handover, Persistent Risk
The most likely path is assessed as limited police reforms (staffing increases, community-policing pilots) taking hold in the near term; a gradual military-to-police handover beginning in the calmest areas over the medium term; and slow but steady structural reform of the justice system and firearms regulation over the long term. Given continued MILF factionalism and stalled decommissioning, this trajectory does not eliminate violence but is assessed as consistent with keeping it at a manageable level.
VI. Indicators to Watch
- Election-period violence indicator: an increase in armed-group activity or voter-intimidation incidents around the September 2026 regional elections would signal that the political-violence risk has materialized.
- MILF unity indicator: the trajectory of relations between the Central Committee and the Macacua faction will directly affect the movement's capacity to follow through on decommissioning commitments.
- Decommissioning indicator: concrete progress on the outstanding 14,000 fighters and 2,450 weapons would be a strong signal that the normalization process has regained momentum.
- Police capacity indicator: measurable growth in regional police staffing and ex-combatant integration would indicate the military-to-police handover could accelerate.
Bottom Line
That the 2014 peace agreement halted insurgent violence in the Bangsamoro does not by itself make the region secure. Clan feuds, political rivalry, firearms proliferation, and weak access to justice remain the core structural obstacles to durable stability. Absent concrete steps on police reform, military-police coordination, access to justice, and firearms control, the likelihood of a recurring cycle of localized violence — particularly through the upcoming election period — remains significant.
Source: Structured analytic adaptation of an open-source, field-research-based policy report on police reform and the security transition in the Bangsamoro, published on or about 3 September 2026. This assessment restates and reorganizes the original report in structured analytic form — including standardized probability language, separated confidence ratings, a formal key-assumptions check, and analysis of alternatives — without adding facts beyond what was reported. Figure 1 is an illustrative analyst schematic, not a modeled forecast.