Libya's Power-Sharing Gamble: Assessing the U.S.-Backed Unification Initiative

Bottom Line Up Front (BLUF)

Washington is pressing forward with a power-sharing initiative aimed at merging Libya's two rival executives, led by U.S. envoy Massad Boulos. Moderate ConfidenceWe assess that institutional reunification remains a worthwhile objective in principle, but that the deal's secrecy and its most contested reported provision — elevating Saddam Haftar, son of eastern strongman Khalifa Haftar, to head of state — risk unsettling rather than consolidating Libya's fragile post-2020 calm if concluded without broader domestic buy-in.

Key Judgments

Key Assumptions

Sourcing Statement

This assessment is derived from the International Crisis Group's briefing "Assessing the New U.S. Initiative for Libya" (22 August 2026), which draws on interviews with Libyan officials, armed-group representatives, businesspeople, and foreign diplomats. No classified reporting informs this product, and AEGIS I AHSAM has not independently verified the underlying sourcing. Confidence levels are calibrated to the degree of independent corroboration reported by Crisis Group; judgments resting on inference about actors' intent, rather than on directly reported statements or events, are marked Low to Moderate. This product is an independent analytic reformatting and does not represent an official assessment of the International Crisis Group, the United States government, or the Intelligence Community.

I. Background: A Country Split Since 2015

Libya's current divide traces back to the aftermath of the 2014 civil war and hardened after a failed 2021 transition: a UN-backed unity government under Abdelhamid Dabaiba stayed in office in Tripoli after promised elections were called off, while the Haftar-aligned parliament in the east installed its own rival administration, now headed by Osama Hamad. A three-member Presidency Council, chaired by Mohamed al-Mnefi, formally serves as collective head of state, though the eastern military command does not recognize its authority over Haftar-led forces.

A 2020 ceasefire ended active fighting and produced a period of relative calm: oil revenue has been distributed widely enough to keep elites on both sides invested in stability, and public construction spending and free public events have bolstered the standing of authorities on each side. That calm comes at a cost, however — persistent institutional dysfunction, continued foreign military presence, and an economy sustained by a mix of licit and off-the-books arrangements that has driven up the cost of living.

II. The U.S. Initiative and Its Drivers

U.S. envoy Massad Boulos has led the mediation effort for roughly the past year, marking a reversal of a decade of relative U.S. disengagement from Libya. Beyond a general interest in diplomatic breakthroughs, three underlying drivers appear to be shaping Washington's renewed attention: an interest in boosting Libyan oil production amid tighter global energy markets, an interest in opening the Libyan market to U.S. commercial investment, and a wish to limit Russia's military foothold in the country by drawing Libya more closely into a U.S.-oriented security framework.

Secrecy has characterized the process throughout. Talks reportedly began with a discreet meeting between representatives of the Dabaiba and Haftar camps, and have continued through direct, largely undisclosed contact between Ibrahim Dabaiba (the prime minister's nephew and adviser) and Saddam Haftar. Libyans have taken to calling the emerging arrangement the "Boulos plan," despite Washington's insistence that it is a broader, jointly owned initiative.

III. Reported Terms and Open Questions

Based on converging accounts from Libyan and foreign sources, the arrangement's core bargain would keep Abdelhamid Dabaiba as prime minister of a unified executive while installing Saddam Haftar as head of the Presidency Council, replacing Mohamed al-Mnefi. Ibrahim Dabaiba would reportedly stay on as national security adviser. Two structural questions remain open: the seat of the new government, contested between Tripoli and the more neutral coastal city of Sirte, and the design of a unified military command, where Haftar's camp has so far resisted options that would share authority currently concentrated under the eastern general command.

Parallel, lower-profile tracks have advanced with less friction. U.S. and Libyan negotiators reported reaching an unpublished agreement in April on a unified national budget, and in early 2025 the U.S. supported changes to the UN sanctions regime enabling foreign training support to both Libyan military camps — a change that allowed officers from each side to train together during the April 2025 Flintlock exercise in Sirte. Neither track has generated controversy comparable to the political component, though the budget deal's continued opacity has drawn its own criticism.

IV. Support and Opposition

Support for the initiative clusters around those positioned to benefit most directly. Saddam Haftar's circle sees the arrangement as formal recognition of a political and military standing he has already built. Within the Dabaiba camp, Ibrahim Dabaiba is described as the deal's strongest internal champion, viewing a U.S.-backed settlement as the surest way to keep his uncle in office, while the prime minister himself is said to harbor greater reservations, including distrust that Saddam Haftar would ultimately try to sideline him. Beyond both camps, a number of Libyan analysts argue that even an imperfect unified authority would represent a net improvement over indefinite division.

Opposition centers on three concerns. First, western Libyan armed factions that fought Haftar's 2019-2020 assault on Tripoli see a Saddam Haftar presidency as a step toward eventual consolidation of power in his hands alone, backed by emergency powers available to the presidency under Libya's 2015 framework agreement; some have signaled a willingness to resist by force. Second, persistent economic hardship — a depreciating currency, restricted cash withdrawals, and chronic fuel and electricity shortages — has left many Libyans skeptical that elite-level reunification will improve daily life. Third, critics object to the process's lack of inclusivity and, in particular, the absence of a firm elections commitment, arguing it risks replacing a promised popular transition with a negotiated continuation of existing power structures.

V. Regional and International Positioning

Foreign alignments have grown less polarized since the 2020 ceasefire, with most external powers now maintaining contact with both Libyan camps. Even so, the U.S. initiative has exposed real differences. France and the United Arab Emirates appear to be its strongest backers, consistent with favorable views of Saddam Haftar and his role in counter-extremism efforts along Libya's borders; French President Emmanuel Macron hosted him in Paris in mid-June. Italy supports the initiative publicly, valuing the security cooperation it has enabled on migration, but is privately anxious that a mishandled deal could trigger conflict and a new wave of migration across the Mediterranean. Egypt, notwithstanding its long-standing backing of the Haftar family, is reportedly the most openly skeptical regional actor, wary of both Saddam Haftar's independence from Cairo's influence and the precedent of hereditary military succession. Türkiye has voiced public support while privately expressing misgivings rooted in strained relations with the Haftars, and Russia's position remains ambiguous, with closer reported ties to Saddam's brother Khaled than to Saddam himself. The United Nations, whose own reunification process the initiative effectively bypasses, has been kept largely on the margins of the talks.

VI. Three Forward Scenarios

Three trajectories frame the plausible near-term outlook, consistent with standard structured-scenario methodology.

VII. Outlook and Recommended Indicators

Crisis Group's underlying assessment argues that U.S. mediators should resist finalizing a political agreement quickly, and should instead broaden consultations, increase transparency around the deal's terms, and pursue parallel progress on budget unification and military cooperation that does not depend on resolving the presidency question first. It further recommends that any elections commitment be paired with a realistic — though flexible — timeline, given the legal and administrative disputes that have repeatedly derailed past attempts to hold a vote.

Indicators to Watch