Iran’s Axis of Resistance: From Forward Defence to Direct Deterrence
22 OCT 2026
AEGIS | AHSAM Regional Analysts
Middle East Desk
High ConfidenceIran no longer relies mainly on regional partners for deterrence. Israeli pressure on Hamas and Hizbollah, the fall of the Assad regime and the war with the United States and Israel since February have changed this. Tehran now gives more weight to missiles, drones and its leverage over the Strait of Hormuz.
Moderate ConfidenceThe axis remains useful, but its functions differ. The Houthis have gained value. Smaller Iraqi cells are replacing large factions in military roles. Hizbollah is weaker, yet Iran is more willing to defend it.
- 01Iran’s strategic centre of gravity has moved from the Levant to the maritime routes of the Gulf and the Red Sea.
- 02The network is more fragmented. Local autonomy is higher, while Tehran controls selected cells more tightly.
- 03Weaker partners are unlikely to reduce Iran’s exposure to conflict. They may draw it in.
Bottom Line Up Front
High ConfidenceIran has shifted its deterrence from “forward defence” through partners to capabilities it controls directly. Moderate ConfidenceTehran will keep its partners and will defend those it sees as vital to its own security. This is likely to expose Iran to more regional conflict, not less.
Key Judgments
| Confidence | Judgment |
|---|---|
| High | KJ-1. Iran now relies more on missiles, drones and its position near the Strait of Hormuz than on partners to deter attack. |
| Moderate | KJ-2. The Houthis are now the most valuable partner for Iran’s maritime strategy. Their ability to threaten Red Sea shipping complements Iranian leverage in the Gulf. |
| Moderate | KJ-3. Iran is very likely to keep using small Iraqi cells for military operations. Large Shiite factions are likely to keep a political role only. |
| Moderate | KJ-4. Iran is likely to keep defending Hizbollah, including by direct force, and to link any deal with Washington to Lebanon. |
| Moderate | KJ-5. Iran is unlikely to rebuild its Levant corridor in the near term. Renewed influence in Syria is possible but uncertain. |
| Low-Moderate | KJ-6. Iran’s approach is likely to deepen hostility among Gulf neighbours and may encourage closer security cooperation among its adversaries. |
Tradecraft Note: Expressing Uncertainty
Probability language in this product follows the standardized scale below. A confidence level is reported separately. Confidence ratings (High / Moderate / Low) reflect the reliability of sourcing and the degree of corroboration. They do not measure the likelihood that a judgment is correct.
| Remote01–05% | Very Unlikely05–20% | Unlikely20–45% | Roughly Even Chance45–55% |
Likely55–80% | Very Likely80–95% | Almost Certain(ly)95–99% |
Key Assumptions, Sourcing, and Confidence Basis
- Source quality: this assessment rests on a single open-source policy analysis. No independent reporting was consulted. This supports Moderate confidence on descriptive judgments and caps forward-looking judgments at Moderate.
- Attributed positions: statements by Iranian officials, analysts and experts are treated as reported. The desk has not confirmed them independently.
- Unverified reporting: claims about clandestine cells in Iraq, Iranian flights to Houthi-held Yemen and Qods Force involvement in Hizbollah’s tactics rely on unnamed sources. They have not been corroborated.
- Information gaps: the desk has no independent view of Iranian decision-making, of partner command structures or of the terms of the June ceasefire memorandum. These gaps lower confidence in forward-looking judgments.
I. From the Levant to Maritime Chokepoints
Before October 2023, Iran’s strategy centred on the Levant. Syria under Assad was the linchpin. It gave Iran a land corridor to Hizbollah, proximity to Israel and a logistical hub. Hizbollah was the main engine. It could threaten Israel from adjacent territory and so deter strikes on Iran.
Three shocks damaged this arrangement. The Gaza campaign weakened Hamas. The fall of Assad in December 2024 removed Iran’s only Arab state partner and cut its supply line to Hizbollah. Israeli attacks then degraded Hizbollah’s leadership and arsenal. The setbacks reinforced one another, because rebuilding Hizbollah without Syria became far harder.
Iran has not abandoned the Levant. Hizbollah keeps institutional ties to Tehran, political weight in Lebanon and some capacity to regroup. Iran may also hope that local resistance to Israeli incursions in southern Syria will open new space for its influence.
Iran’s attention has nonetheless turned to waters closer to home. In June, a senior Qods Force commander described a “security belt” from the Gulf to the Red Sea. The phrase marks a shift in emphasis away from the Levant. In the Strait of Hormuz, Iran needs no partner. It can threaten ships with missiles and drones from its own territory. The Houthis add reach in the Red Sea and the Bab al-Mandab. Iraq no longer serves as a land bridge, but it still links the Houthis, Iraqi groups and the Qods Force.
II. A More Fragmented Network
The Qods Force lost its coordinating role after the death of Qassem Soleimani in 2020. Later wars and leadership losses weakened command structures further. Iran has therefore worked increasingly through smaller groups or selected parts of larger ones.
Iraq shows this trend most clearly. Older Shiite movements now hold government posts and economic interests. They are more cautious about actions that invite retaliation. Early in the current war, several major groups declined to mobilise. Iran turned to smaller factions. Iraqi sources also describe clandestine cells, set up by the Revolutionary Guards outside militia chains of command. These cells are reportedly linked to attacks on Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.
Smaller groups offer Iran clear advantages. They cost less, they can hide their affiliations and they face fewer political limits. Larger factions remain useful for a different reason. They help Iran keep influence in Iraq and protect the political space in which smaller groups operate.
Hizbollah has adapted in another way. Its operations now resemble guerrilla raids. It uses cheap first-person-view drones against Israeli forces in southern Lebanon. This approach reduces its exposure to airstrikes and intelligence penetration. One expert with ties to both organisations reports Qods Force involvement in this change.
| Partner | Current Role for Iran | Confidence |
|---|---|---|
| Houthis | Highest strategic value. They complement Iranian leverage over Hormuz and the Gulf with a threat to Red Sea shipping. Iran reportedly provides guidance and military aid. Direct flights to Houthi-held areas in July point to deeper support. | Moderate |
| Hizbollah | Reduced deterrent value, but still a secondary front. It forced Israel to defend a second front after February. Iran frames the confrontation as including Lebanon. | Moderate |
| Major Iraqi factions | Political partners that preserve Iranian influence in Iraq. They are reluctant to fight for Tehran. | Moderate |
| Small Iraqi cells | Preferred instruments for attacks on Gulf states. Tehran controls them more directly. | Low-Moderate |
| Syria | Lost as a state partner. Future influence depends on local resistance to Israel and remains uncertain. | Low-Moderate |
III. Deterrence Moves Closer to Home
Iran’s earlier doctrine relied on forward defence. Partners were to keep conflict away from Iranian territory. Direct retaliation was a second layer. The past three years exposed the limits of this model. The network did not prevent Israeli exchanges with Iran in 2024, the Israeli strike in June 2025 or the confrontation with the United States and Israel since February. Tehran therefore gave more weight to its own missiles, drones and geography.
The axis still matters. Iranian decision-makers believe that certain partners can multiply Iran’s own capabilities. The current war has strengthened this view.
Iran’s behaviour towards Hizbollah illustrates the point. In June, Iran fired missiles at Israel in response to the Israeli campaign in Lebanon. The usual pattern was reversed, since Iran defended its partner. Iran also made its acceptance of the short-lived 17 June memorandum depend on an end to Israeli attacks in Lebanon. Israel continued its offensive. In mid-September it demolished an underground Hizbollah complex at Ali al-Taher. This showed that Iranian threats had not deterred Israel.
Institutional ties, ideology and past investment explain this commitment. Iranian experts say that parts of the security establishment link Hizbollah’s survival to Iran’s own security. Public commentary in Iran frames an attack on a partner as a step towards renewed war with Iran. A weaker partner may thus give Tehran more reason to intervene. Efforts to curb Iranian influence by targeting partners may therefore draw Iran into conflict. The extent of its involvement is likely to depend on the relationship, and on the risks and costs of acting.
IV. Outlook — Analysis of Alternatives
The trajectories below are treated as competing hypotheses. They are not mutually exclusive.
Revival of the Levant Axis
Iran rebuilds its supply routes to Hizbollah and regains influence in Syria. Assessed as unlikely. Iran has lost its Syrian corridor and Hizbollah is degraded.
Partner Retreat
Iran reduces its commitment to weakened partners and avoids conflict on their behalf. Assessed as unlikely. Recent Iranian actions on Lebanon point the other way.
Return to Forward Defence
Partners again become the first layer of Iranian deterrence. Assessed as very unlikely. The current war showed that partners cannot keep conflict away from Iran.
Composite Trajectory — Direct Deterrence With Selective Partner Support
Iran relies on its own missiles, drones and Hormuz leverage. It deepens ties with the Houthis, works through small Iraqi cells and defends Hizbollah when it judges the risk acceptable. This preserves Iranian reach. It also raises Iran’s direct exposure and may harden Gulf and Israeli responses.
V. Indicators to Watch
- Houthi indicator: new Iranian flights, advisers or weapons deliveries to Houthi-held Yemen, and Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping.
- Iraq indicator: attacks on Gulf states by small Iraqi groups, and whether large factions join them.
- Lebanon indicator: further Iranian missile fire in response to Israeli operations, and any Iranian demand to include Lebanon in a settlement.
- Hizbollah indicator: the spread of drone-based guerrilla tactics and any sign of rebuilt long-range capability.
- Syria indicator: signs of local armed resistance to Israel in the south and of Iranian efforts to support it.
- Gulf indicator: new security arrangements among Iran’s adversaries in response to Iranian pressure.
Bottom Line
The axis of resistance is weaker, but it is not finished. It now serves different purposes. Iran has moved its deterrence closer to home and bears more of the cost. Tehran is likely to keep defending partners it sees as vital. Pressure on those partners is therefore unlikely to shield others from Iranian responses. It may widen the conflict.