Ten Challenges for the UN in 2026–2027: Institutional Strain and Limited Leverage
21 SEP 2026
AEGIS | AHSAM Regional Analysts
Multilateral Diplomacy Desk
High ConfidenceAs the 2026 General Assembly opens, the United Nations is under severe financial and political strain. The United States has paid only part of the nearly USD 4 billion in dues it owes. The Secretariat's 2026 budget fell by almost 15 per cent, and its staff by 19 per cent. The Security Council remains stalled on the most salient crises, including the US-Israeli war with Iran, Ukraine and Sudan.
Moderate ConfidenceSecretary-General António Guterres leaves office at the end of December. The five permanent members will likely decide who succeeds him. A new Secretary-General is unlikely to remove the UN's structural constraints. That person can, however, redirect the organisation toward peacemaking and conflict management.
- 01Funding cuts and liquidity shortfalls have materially reduced UN operational capacity. Further cuts are almost certain to be proposed in December.
- 02Council diplomacy is likely to stay blocked on the largest crises. Cooperation among major powers is likely to continue on second-tier files.
- 03The most likely path through 2027 is managed decline with selective adaptation, not a rapid revival.
Bottom Line Up Front
High ConfidenceThe UN's capacity to manage crises has fallen sharply. Funding cuts, liquidity shortfalls and great-power rivalry are the main causes. Moderate ConfidenceWithout a shift in US and Chinese positions on funding, the organisation is likely to keep firefighting and improvising through 2027. The next Secretary-General can set a new direction. That person cannot remove these constraints.
Key Judgments
| Confidence | Judgment |
|---|---|
| High | KJ-1. Funding cuts and liquidity shortfalls have materially reduced UN operational capacity. The Secretariat, humanitarian agencies and peacekeeping missions are all affected. |
| Moderate | KJ-2. The United States and China will almost certainly propose further Secretariat cuts in the December budget talks. |
| Moderate | KJ-3. The Security Council is likely to remain blocked on Iran, Ukraine and Sudan. Cooperation among the United States, Russia and China is likely to stay limited to second-tier files. |
| Moderate | KJ-4. The permanent members are likely to remain the decisive actors in selecting the next Secretary-General. Their handling of transparency demands will affect the successor's credibility. |
| Moderate | KJ-5. No arrangement in southern Lebanon is likely to disarm Hizbollah fully or end Israeli operations. Closing UNIFIL without a successor would leave a security vacuum. |
| Moderate | KJ-6. The UN is unlikely to lead efforts to end the war in Sudan. It is better placed to support other diplomatic tracks and prepare for humanitarian access and ceasefire monitoring. |
| Moderate | KJ-7. The Security Council is unlikely to take corrective action on Gaza before the Board of Peace mandate ends in 2027. The General Assembly is the main remaining UN forum. |
| Moderate | KJ-8. Security gains in Haiti and the Central African Republic depend on sustained UN support. Rapid drawdown or thin funding would weaken them. |
| Moderate | KJ-9. US pressure on the International Criminal Court is likely to prompt further withdrawal announcements. It will weaken the Court's leverage. |
| Low-Moderate | KJ-10. The General Assembly is unlikely to approve many more UN80 reform proposals before Guterres leaves office. The proposed merger of UNFPA and UN Women remains unresolved. |
Tradecraft Note: Expressing Uncertainty
Probability language in this product follows the standardized scale below. A confidence level is reported separately. Confidence ratings (High / Moderate / Low) reflect the reliability of sourcing and the degree of corroboration. They do not measure the likelihood that a judgment is correct.
| Remote01–05% | Very Unlikely05–20% | Unlikely20–45% | Roughly Even Chance45–55% |
Likely55–80% | Very Likely80–95% | Almost Certain(ly)95–99% |
Key Assumptions, Sourcing, and Confidence Basis
- Source quality: this assessment draws on a single open-source policy briefing, published on 14 September 2026. No additional independent reporting was consulted. This supports Moderate-to-High confidence on descriptive judgments. It caps forward-looking judgments at Moderate.
- Scope: the product covers the briefing's review of Council diplomacy, the Secretary-General, UN reform and the selection process. It covers the first seven challenges in full and the eighth in part. It does not address the final two challenges (the future of peace operations and the Secretary-General's crisis-management approach) or the briefing's conclusion.
- Figures cited: the financial figures, personnel numbers, troop levels, funding data and straw poll results are as reported in the source. They have not been independently verified by this desk. The straw poll results are unofficial.
- Attributed positions: positions of governments, diplomats and UN officials, including those drawn from interviews, are treated as reported statements. They are not independently confirmed. The authoring organisation discloses that one candidate for Secretary-General sits on its board of trustees.
- Information gaps: the desk had no independent view of permanent-member preferences, the confidential MINUSCA transition report, or the unreleased Lebanon-Israel security annex. The annex text was leaked, and the parties have not challenged its authenticity. These gaps lower confidence in forward-looking judgments.
I. The UN's Institutional Position
The UN's financial position has worsened sharply over the past year. The United States has paid only part of the nearly USD 4 billion it owes in dues. In late August, Washington agreed to pay USD 725 million to the regular budget. The source reports that this sum was calculated to avoid losing the US vote in the General Assembly under Article 19 of the Charter. China has also delayed its annual payments, although it does not usually accumulate arrears.
Washington has not withdrawn wholesale from the organisation. Since the end of 2025, it has provided nearly USD 5 billion in voluntary funding to OCHA, UNICEF and the World Food Programme. These funds are heavily earmarked. They remain well below historical levels. US officials have also signalled an intention to keep the UN on tight budgets. The United States has withdrawn from several UN bodies.
The cuts have been deep. Member states agreed to a reduction of almost 15 per cent in the Secretariat's 2026 budget and a 19 per cent reduction in staff. In October 2025, the Secretary-General ordered all peacekeeping missions to cut budgets by at least 15 per cent. Nearly 13,000 uniformed and civilian personnel were repatriated. Missions in South Sudan, the DRC and the Central African Republic have reduced patrols, closed bases and suspended local dialogue initiatives.
In June, member states amended a long-standing rule that required unspent funds to be returned to members as credits. The change offers short-term relief ahead of High-Level Week. It is unlikely to reverse the contingency measures already in place. Structural reform is also constrained. In March, the General Assembly approved changes to how mandates are created and fulfilled. It avoided streamlining the more than 40,000 existing mandates. Members have resisted proposals to merge UN agencies.
II. Council Dynamics and the Search for a New Secretary-General
The US-Iran conflict has become the Council's defining crisis. Hostilities resumed on 28 February. China and Russia abstained on a Bahrain-led resolution that condemned Iranian strikes on Gulf states. They later vetoed a US-Gulf text that would have endorsed a naval coalition to reopen the Strait of Hormuz. A second draft attracted more than 138 co-sponsors but was never put to a vote. Council diplomacy on the file has since stalled. China and Russia have also blocked the appointment of chairs for all Council sanctions committees and working groups this year. This follows the snapback of UN sanctions on Iran, which they consider illegal.
Cooperation persists on lower-profile files. The United States and China have traded support on Haiti, the Afghanistan file, the delisting of two Syrian officials and appointments to UN missions. Most other Council members avoid open criticism of Washington. When members act together, and US core interests are not at stake, they can sometimes shape outcomes. Their defence of the South Sudan and Abyei mandates illustrates this.
The Secretary-General's influence has been limited. His Hormuz initiative attracted praise but produced little. Neither Moscow nor Washington is eager to engage him. Many diplomats now want a successor who places peace and security at the centre of the UN's work.
Eight candidates are in the race, and six are women. The Council held straw polls on 30 July and 21 August. A candidate needs at least nine votes and no objection from a permanent member. Rebeca Grynspan led the first poll with ten encouraging votes. Carolyn Rodrigues Birkett led the second with eight. The published figures do not separate permanent-member votes. Many diplomats fear their own preferences will not matter, since the permanent members will decide.
Three questions shape the contest. First, regional rotation points to Latin America. The permanent members face political pressure to follow it, but it is unclear whether they will. Second, views differ on choosing a first woman. China's ambassador welcomed the prospect. US sources say Washington will not oppose a candidate on gender alone. US officials and lawmakers have, however, objected to Michelle Bachelet over her record on abortion access. Third, transparency is contested. The permanent members agreed to include Olara Otunnu in a Council poll before he appeared at a General Assembly hearing. The General Assembly president protested. Ivonne A-Baki entered four days before the second poll, which raised concern about late entries.
III. Country and Thematic Files
The source identifies ten challenges. This section summarises the eight covered by this product. The assessments below are drawn from the source and are rated for confidence.
| File | Assessment | Confidence |
|---|---|---|
| Southern Lebanon | UNIFIL closes by the end of 2026. Troop withdrawal will continue beyond 31 December. The 26 June US-Israel-Lebanon framework has already run into trouble. Israel makes full Hizbollah disarmament a condition for withdrawal. Beirut cannot compel disarmament in practice. Hizbollah rejects the direct talks. Any deal is likely to need third-party verification. Options include a smaller UN follow-on mission, a French-Italian coalition and an EU training mission. Any mission would have to work alongside the US-led arrangement and would need US support in the Council. | Moderate |
| Sudan | The UN remains on the margins of diplomacy. Envoy Pekka Haavisto took up his post in February. The Quad roadmap has won over neither side. Sudanese participants in the Quintet track cannot agree on next steps. The country is effectively partitioned between the army and the RSF. An independent UN panel found that RSF atrocities in El Fasher pointed to a genocidal trajectory. Diplomats warn of similar risks in El-Obeid. | Moderate |
| Gaza | Resolution 2803 (November 2025) endorsed the US ceasefire plan and created the Board of Peace as a transitional administration. Its mandate runs to the end of 2027. The UN takes no part in the Board's structures. Reconstruction is near a standstill. The General Assembly has discussed Gaza only once, indirectly, since November 2025. The source argues that members should use the Assembly to assess the Board's performance and to keep pressure on the ceasefire. | Moderate |
| Haiti | The Gang Suppression Force landed in June. About 1,200 troops are on the ground, against a target of 5,500. A UN support office handles logistics and funding. Gains will be short-lived without programmes that let gang members leave and without stronger courts. Special judicial units and a revived disarmament commission are early steps. Civilian harm and personnel misconduct are ongoing risks. | Moderate |
| Central African Republic | The United States and China favour preparing MINUSCA's exit. Elections passed in December 2025 without major disruption. Insecurity persists along the eastern border, and Sudan's war adds spillover risk. Financial pressure has already forced the repatriation of nearly 4,000 troops and the closure of 21 bases. The source argues that November's mandate renewal should preserve capacity in the east. | Moderate |
| International Criminal Court | The US campaign against the Court, announced in July, includes sanctions on senior Court officials. Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger began withdrawal procedures in June. Venezuela and Chad followed in July. Colombia's new president is reportedly considering withdrawal. The dismissal of the former prosecutor, who denied the allegations against him, has also damaged the Court's standing. The source urges member states to signal support and to use the annual General Assembly resolution for that purpose. | Moderate |
| Myanmar | A nominally civilian administration took office in April. Neighbouring states are giving it de facto recognition. The UN has little leverage. It remains vital for humanitarian delivery. The World Bank and the Asian Development Bank rely on UN agencies for fiduciary oversight. The Credentials Committee meets in November. An ICJ ruling in the genocide case brought by The Gambia may fall at the same time. Such a ruling would intensify disputes over the administration's legitimacy. | Moderate |
| UN gender work (partial coverage) | The Secretary-General proposed merging UNFPA and UN Women under UN80. The merger would save USD 32–38 million a year. Many states and officials fear that contested areas of work could be cut in any negotiation. The two agencies play distinct roles in Afghanistan and in the Rohingya response in Bangladesh. A group of major donors said it could not support the proposal. Russia and China have stressed the need to protect both mandates. | Low-Moderate |
IV. Outlook — Analysis of Alternatives
The trajectories below are treated as competing hypotheses. They are not mutually exclusive.
Sharp Deterioration
Deeper US withdrawal, larger arrears and a weak Secretary-General lead to further mission closures. Assessed as unlikely. Washington has kept funding selected agencies and no longer appears intent on a wholesale retreat.
Rapid Revival Under New Leadership
A new Secretary-General quickly restores the UN's political relevance and financial stability. Assessed as very unlikely. One administrator cannot resolve structural funding gaps or great-power divisions.
Council Role in an Iran Settlement
The Council endorses or supports a US-Iran settlement. Assessed as unlikely in the near term. Officials on both sides accept some Council role, but talks are unresolved and Council diplomacy has stalled.
Composite Trajectory — Managed Decline With Selective Adaptation
The most likely path combines further budget cuts, continued reliance on earmarked US voluntary funds and a divided Council on Iran, Ukraine and Sudan. The UN keeps its operational role in humanitarian aid, peace operations and protracted crises where few other actors can act. A new Secretary-General sets a clearer peace-and-security direction. Concrete gains in 2027 remain limited.
V. Indicators to Watch
- Budget indicator: the scale of Secretariat cuts proposed by the United States and China in December will show whether further shrinkage is under way.
- Selection indicator: whether any candidate reaches nine encouraging votes with no permanent-member objection, and whether new candidates enter late.
- Lebanon indicator: Council authorisation of any UNIFIL successor before the end of 2026, and progress on the pilot zones, the French-Italian coalition and the EU mission.
- CAR indicator: the scope of the November MINUSCA mandate renewal, especially capacity in the east.
- Gaza indicator: whether any member state asks to reconvene the General Assembly's Tenth Emergency Special Session.
- ICC indicator: the outcome of the General Assembly's ICC resolution talks in October and November, and any further withdrawal announcements.
- Myanmar indicator: the Credentials Committee decision in November and the timing of the ICJ ruling.
- Haiti and Sudan indicators: Gang Suppression Force strength against its 5,500 target, funding for reintegration and justice programmes, and the content of Haavisto's revised strategy.
Bottom Line
The UN's weakness does not make it irrelevant. It still delivers humanitarian aid, mounts peace operations and manages protracted crises that few other actors can handle. Funding cuts and great-power rivalry, however, have narrowed what it can do. The next Secretary-General is unlikely to remove these constraints. The decisive moments come soon: the December budget talks, the Council's selection process and the November mandate decisions. Absent a shift in major-power positions, the UN is likely to continue firefighting through 2027.
Source: International Crisis Group, Special Briefing N°15, “Ten Challenges for the UN in 2026-2027”, 14 September 2026. This assessment reorganises the original briefing and adds no facts beyond those reported. Figures 1 and 2 use data reported in the briefing. Figure 3 is an illustrative analyst schematic, not a modelled forecast.